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IN EARLY 1989, the Bureau of the Census
released its latest population projections for the
United States through 2080, showing slower
growth in the total population from 1990 through
2035 and little growth thereafter.1 At the same
time, the median age of the US. population is
projected to continue rising. The rising median
age primarily reflects the aging of the baby-
boom generation, those born between 1946 and
1964. Given these projections, it is natural to
ask whether the United States will be able to
maintain its standard of living into the next cen-
tury. A typical example of such concern recent-
ly appeared in the “Labor Letter” column of the
Wall Street Journa!:z
GRIM FORECAST: Most baby boomers “will find
retirement at age 65 unaffordable” when they
getthere starting in 20 years, a survey of North
American actuaries finds. They blame inadequate
savings, tax incentives and too few workers.
The purpose of this article is to explore the
arithmetic that underlies the broad economic
implications of these population projections.
This involves deriving projections of the civilian
labor force and employment from the popula-
tion projections. Achieving certain rates of in-
crease in the standard of living means achieving
certain rates of growth of the U.S. capital stock.
The feasibility of these various capital stock re-
quirements is examined in light of historical ex-




The Census Bureau has prepared population
projections for the United States for the last 30
years.3 In its most recent report, the Bureau
constructed three basic projection series using
1flureau of the Census (1989).
2Wa// StreetJournal (1989). For a general discussion of the
challenges facing the U.S. economy in the future, see
Council of Economic Advisers (1990), chapter 4.
The bureau reports that, for a projection period of 15
years, the root-mean-square error of previous projected
growth rates is 0.40 percentage points. The difference be-
tween the growth rate for its highest (lowest) projection
series and the middle series for 1990 to 2005 is 0.34
(0.29) percentage points. 3For a discussion of the forecast accuracy of population
projections, see Bureau of the Census (1989), pp. 14-16.4
Table 1
Historical and Projected (Middle Series) Population
Growth: 1950-2050
Percentage
Medial age of population
Growth in years 65 and over
Period rate (end of period) (end of period)
Actual
1950 to 1960 1 72°/s 29.4 9.2°/a
1960 to 1970 1 27 27.9 9.8
1970 to 1980 1.06 30.0 11.3
Projected:
1980 to 1990 095 33.0 12.8
1990 to 2000 069 36.4 13.0
2000 to 2010 0.52 38.9 13.9
2010 to 2020 0.41 40.2 177
2020 to 2030 0.21 41 .8 21 8
2030 to 2040 0.04 42.6 22.6
2040 to 2050 —0.07 427 22.9
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migration starts with 600 000 persons per year and :s
reducec and kept at 500.000 persons ~e’ year after 1997.
Compared with the zero net-immigration case rhs in-
been under way for a number of years. The
total population grew at a 1.7 percent annual
rate from 1950 to 1960, then slowed to a 1.3
percent rate in the 1960s, before slowing even
further in the 1970s and 1980s. From 1990 to
2040, the Census Bureau projects a positive, but
steadily declining population growth rate; after
2040 the population level itself is projected to
decline.
As table 1 shows, one notable feature of the
projections is the expected aging of the popula-
tion. The median age reached a post-1960 low
of 27.9 years in 1970 and is estimated to reach
33 years in 1990, before climbing to 42.7 years
by 2050. Hand in hand with this overall aging
of the population is the rising proportion of the
population that is age 65 and older.
The major issue of concern is whether slow-
ing growth in the population, combined with
the rising age composition, bodes ill for main-
taining a continuing rise in the nation’s standard
of living.
creases the population estimate for 2050 by 49 million per-
sons, or 19.5 percent. Each 100,000 net immigrants per
year has the effect of increasing the 1990-2050 average
population growth rate by about 0.05 percent. After 1998,
the low net-immigration assumption levels out at 300,000
persons per year, and the high assumption levels out at
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Unfortunately, the Census Bureau and the
Department of Labor do not provide labor force
and employment projections as far into the fu-
ture as the year 2050. Therefore, such projec-
tions must be estimated in some manner. Such
projections require information about the rate
at which the population will participate in the
civilian labor force and the rate at which this
labor force will be employed. These rates, in
turn, depend on the age and sex composition of
the population and the labor force.
.Fa.rticin:n:(on .11ales
Table 2 summarizes historical and projected
participation rates for 10 age-sex groups for
10-year periods from 1950 through 2000. The
projected figures for 1990 and 2000 are based
on estimates made by the Department of Labor.5
For purposes of this analysis, these same age-
sex group projections for 2000 are assumed to
hold constant through 2050.°
Even though the participation rates are held
constant for each age-sex group, the total par-
ticipation rate changes quite dramatically in the
°Fullerton(1989).
6The effects of an alternative set of participation rate
assumptions based on a continuation of recent trends
were also examined. In particular, labor force participation
of females between the ages of 16 and 64 was assumed
to continue rising throughout the 2000 to 2050 period, with
the participation rate of all females 3.7 percentage points
above the basic assumption by 2050. These alternative
assumptions increased the overall participation rate by
about 2 percentage points by 2050 and reduced the re-
quired growth rate of the capital stock (for a given stan-























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To assess the economic implications of these
projections on the standard of living, one must
define and measure the standard of living. An
admittedly crude, but commonly used, measure
of the standard of living is GNP per capita. It
does not capture changes in the distribution of
real income among the population, but, for an
economically advanced country like the United
States, it is deemed useful in sketching the pro-
spects for future economic growth. Three sce-
narios are developed:
Scenario 1: what growth in the nation’s capital
stock would be required to keep
real GNP/capita growing at about
1.85 percent per year, its actual
growth rate from 1948 to 1989?
Scenario 2: what growth in the nation’s capital
stock would be required if real
GNP/capita remained constant at its
1990 value? In this case, there would
be zero growth (no change) in the
nation’s standard of living.
Scenario 3: what would the growth in GNP/capita
be if the capital stock grew at its
1943-39 trend rate? This is an in-
termediate case, between scenario 1
and 2.
Figure 5 depicts these alternative standard-of-
living assumptions graphically.8
‘Note that graphing scenario 3 gets ahead of our story:
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Deriving the capital stock or GNP per capita
specified in the scenarios described above re-
quires the use of an estimated production func-
tion. The function chosen was developed by
Rasche-Tatom (1977) and updated in Tatom
(1988). This production function is Cobb-Douglas
in form and includes an implicit time trend
(proxy for technical change) and the relative
price of energy (for details, see appendix). Based
on this estimated production function, each
standard-of-living assumption includes a compo-
nent of growth equal to 0.81 percent per year
because of an implicit time trend.°
The derived results for the capital stock are
summarized in table 3 and shown in figure 6.
Table 3 decomposes the growth of GNP per
capita in two ways: (1) its simple components,
GNP and population, and (2) the contribution of
resource inputs and the employment-population
ratio. The decomposition for the 1948-89 period
shows that GNP per capita grew rapidly, in
part, because employment growth dramatically
exceeded population growth. For the 1990-2050
9This estimate of technical progress is of critical importance
in deriving the estimates of capital stock requirements.
The estimate of 0.81 per year is optimistic; estimating the
production function with a zero-one dummy suggests that
technical progress has been only 0.45 percent annually
since 1968.
Energy price shocks have important effects on GNP and
the standard of living, but for these projections the relative
price of energy is assumed to be unchanged from its 1989





1950 1970 1990 2010 2030IC
Table 3
Decomposition of Per Capita GNP Growth’
Projected: 1990-2050
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Historical Trend growth Zero growth Trend growth
1948-89 in GNP/capita in GNP/capita in capital stock
Real GNP growth 3.27% 2.17% 0.30°/a 1.78%
Minus: population growth 1.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Equals. per capita GNP growth 1.972 1.872 0.00 1.48
Or
Real GNP growth 3.27 2.17 0.30 1.78
Technical progress 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
Plus employment contribution 1.36 0.21 0.21 0.21
Employment growth 1.72 0.26 0.26 0 26
Times: elasticity (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0 79)
Plus: capital stock contribution 0.76 1.14 —0.70 0.76
Capital stock growth 3.60 5.45 —3.33 3.60
Times: elasticity (0.21) (0.21) (021) (0.21)
Minus: employment growth 1.72 0.26 0.26 02 6
Plus: change in employment-population ratio 0.42 —0.04 —0.04 —004
Employment growth 1.72 02 6 0.26 0.26
Minus: population growth 1.30 0.30 0 30 0.30
Equals: per capita GNP growth3 1.972 1.872 000 1.48
I Some components do not add to total because of rounding or production function error.
2 Rates calculated from initial year to terminal year, which difters from rate in text which is trend rate fitted to 1948-89.
— P — (X-L) + (L.-P), i.e.. productivity growth plus change in employment-population ratio. The contribution of the change
in the relative price of energy was zero historically, and zero by assumption tar the projection period
Figure 6
Capital Stock Requirements1
Ratio Scale Ratio Scale
Trillions of 1982 Dollars Trillions of 1982 Dollars
2010 2030 2050 1950 1970 1990 1
t4et real nonresidential fixed capital stockperiod, the employment and population projec-
tions place a greater burden on capital stock
growth in achieving GNP growth.
As figure 6 shows, the differences in the
necessary capital stock among the alternatives
are huge by 2050. Expressing these require.
ments in terms of rates of change of the capital
stock from 1990 to 2050 (also shown in table 3),
the differences are more understandable. To
achieve the 1948-89 trend growth rate in real
GNP per capita, given the population-employ-
ment projections, would require a 5.45 percent
average rate of growth in the capital stock,
much faster than the 3.60 percent trend rate of
growth from 1948-89.
The second alternative of no growth in real
GNP per capita implies a steady decline in the
capital stock. This reflects most clearly the role
of technical change in the production function.
A combination of declining capital stock and
continuing growth in technical change is quite
implausible, however. If the rate of technical
progress were zero, the capital stock would
have to rise slightly at a 0.44 percent average
rate, rather than fall, to keep the standard of
living constant at the 1990 level.
In VC8ti’fl(~flt Ilatw
An alternative way of examining these results
is to look at the annualized first difference of
the capital stock relative to GNP, that is, the in-
vestment ratioJ°The annualized difference of
the capital stock represents the flow of net real
nonresidential fixed investment in plant and
equipment. The investment ratio averaged 3.06
percent during 1948-89, with a maximum value
of 4.29 percent in 1966.
The impossibility of maintaining a rise in the
standard of living at the 1948-89 trend rate
becomes obvious in figure 7; it would require a
sharp and continuing increase in the investment
ratio after 2000. The investment ratio averages
16 percent from 1995 to 2050.
The no-growth alternative, of course, implies
a steady decline in the capital stock and a nega-
tive investment-GNP ratio. If technical progress
were zero, however, the capital stock require-
ments would be higher. An average investment
ratio of 0.42 percent would be required for
1995-2050 under such assumptions.
The final alternative—a capital stock that con-
tinued to rise at its 1948-89 trend rate—implies
a slowly rising investment ratio that reaches 10
percent by 2050, still well above any value it
reached during 1948-89. For this scenario, the
growth of per capita real GNP varies over the
projection period depending on the projected
growth rate of employment; however, it aver-
ages about 1.48 percent from 1990 to 2050 (see
figure 5).
(i’ll I]E,1/C It.I\J%.L’041’IC.,/%,L/ 1I/04’I’I()S
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Another way to assess the likelihood of alter-
native assumptions is to examine their implied
productivity trends relative to historical ex-
perience. These trends are shown in figure 8.
Scenario 1 implies a growth rate for productivi-
ty of 1.90 percent from 1990 to 2050, much
faster than its 1.52 percent trend rate of growth
from 1948-89. The no-growth scenario requires
only a 0.04 percent rate of increase in produc-
tivity. Scenario 3 yields a growth rate of pro-
ductivity of 1.52 percent, or the same as the
trend rate from 1948-89.”
Cnp-LtaI’--Ilab4ir .04<0,104141;
An examination of capital-labor ratios can also
be used to assess the feasibility of the three
standard-of-living alternatives. The implied capi-
tal-labor ratios for these scenarios, summarized
in figure 9, must be interpreted with care. Over
the 1948-89 period, the capital-labor ratio rose
slowly, at a 1.85 percent annual rate. More sig-
nificantly, however, its rate of increase has de-
clined over this period, from a 3.2 percent
growth rate from 1948-58, to a 2.1 percent rate
from 1958-75, to a 0.6 percent rate of growth
since 1975. With this pattern in mind, calcula-
tion of capital-labor ratios for the alternative
scenarios does not yield clear-cut conclusions.
‘°Sincethe projections were for every fifth year starting with
1995, investment was calculated as:
AK, = ( (K,/K,,)°’’—1). K, -
This was divided by the level of GNP in year t to get the
investment ratio.
“tn general, implied productivity trends shed little light on
feasibility because they follow from the per capita GNP
assumptions; productivity growth differs from per capita
GNP growth by the difference between projected popula-
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Scenario 1 requires a rise in the ratio to 5.18
percent a year from 1990 to 2050, much faster
than that which occurred even during the 1948-
58 period. The zero-growth case does not match
historical experience at all. The trend-growth-of-
capital scenario requires a rise in the capital-
labor ratio of 3.34 percent per year. While this
is in line with the early post-war experience, it




The capital stock requirements associated with
the Census Bureau’s high and low population
projections are summarized in table 4. The basic
assumptions about participation rates, unem-
ployment rates and the production function are
the same as used above for the middle-series
population projection. The high-series popula-
tion projection is 38 percent higher than the
middle projection in 2050, while the low-series
projection is 23 percent lower. Despite this wide
variation in population, the capital requirements
do not differ greatly from those derived with
the middle-series projection. The differences are
relatively small because, as shown in figure 10,
the pattern of movement of the employment-
population ratio over the 1990-2050 period dif-
fers very little across the alternative projections.
This ratio is the key factor underlying the cru-
cial importance placed on capital stock growth
in achieving the particular growth rates in per
capita income that were examined. In fact, the
high series population projection requires the
largest capital stock, because its projected age
distribution has the smallest proportion of the
population actually working.
C(JNC.LESIONS
The growth of the nation’s output depends on
the growth of its labor force, its capital stock
Ratio Scale
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land technical progress. The Census Bureau has
released projections of U.S. population into the
21st century. Their middle projection shows
slowing growth in the population through 2040,
followed by a slight decline in the population
itself for the rest of the outlook period. They
also project that the median age of the popula-
tion will rise steadily, implying that the work
force as a proportion of the total population will
eventually decline. Can a rising standard of liv-
ing be achieved in the face of such projections?
The conclusions derived from the study are as
follows:
(1) Achieving a rising standard of living at the rate
experienced from 1948-89 does not appear
possible. Based on an estimated technical pro-
gress of 0.8 percent per year, the nation’s capi-
tal stock would have to grow at a 5.5 percent
average annual rate from 1990 to 2050, well
above its 3.6 percent rate of growth from 1948
to 1989. Achieving this higher capital stock
growth would require an investment-GNP ratio
that reaches 33 percent by 2050.
(2) Maintaining the 1990 standard of living at a
constant level requires that the capital stock
decline at a 3.3 percent rate. This case was not
intended to be taken seriously; it is presented
solely to show, given this analysis, why zero
growth (or less) is an unlikely possibility.
(3) Continued growth in the capital stock at its
1948-89 trend rate yields a growth rate in per
capita real GNP of 1.5 percent. However, to
achieve this would require a steadily rising
investment-GNP ratio that reaches 10 percent
by 2050. While achieving this ratio would be
unusual, the required ratio would be within
the range of historical experience until 2015.
Left unexamined in this study is an analysis of
the prospects for saving.12 Capital stock require-
ments will not be achieved unless resources are
released for investment by abstaining from pre-
sent consumption. By using historical trends in
realized investment-GNP ratios, however, an ap-
proximate determination of feasible growth
paths was possible. Increasing the standard of
living at the 1948-89 pace appears impossible.
On the other hand, achieving a rising standard
of living in the I to 1.5 percent range appears
achievable in light of historical experience.
P 5F5115NSFS
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The production function used in this study is
a version of the one originally developed by
Rasche and Tatom (1977) and modified and up-
dated in Tatom (1988). It is a Cobb-Douglas
function with labor, capital and energy specified
as resource inputs. GNP (in 1982 dollars) was
estimated as a function of total civilian employ-
ment, net real nonresidential fixed capital stock
adjusted for capacity utilization and the relative
price of energy. Using annual data for 1954-89
(omitting the early post-war years and the Kor-
ean War), the following estimate was obtained
where din is the first difference of the loga-
rithm (t-values in parentheses):
= 930 DW 1.952
SE=.010 Q189
X = GNP in 1982 dollars
K = net nonresidential fixed capital stock in
1982 dollars
U = Federal Reserve capacity utilization rate
(manufacturing)
L = total civilian employment
P = relative price of energy (ratio of produ-
cer prices of fuel, related products, and
power to the GNP implicit price deflator)
This estimated production function was solved
for In KU and used to derive estimates of the
capital stock for the alternative assumptions
making use of the GNP estimates implied by
those alternatives and the total employment
estimates derived from the population projec-
tions. The 1989 values of the relative price of
energy N’ .577) and the capacity utilization rate
(= .839) were held constant during the projec-
tion period in the derivation of the net real
IL’ dIn(~) = .0081309 + .787 dIn i
(3.88) (19.85)
— .O4ldlnP
(—2.35) capital stock.